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Over the last few years, the debate on labor market reform has been at
the center of economic policy debate in Argentina. This debate has been
fueled by the sustained growth in the unemployment rate observed during
the decade. One of the major targets of the attack on labor market regula-
tion has been high dismissal costs.1
Attempts to reduce dismissal costs for all existing jobs have faced strong
opposition. As a compromise, and to stimulate job creation, employment
promotion contracts for new jobs were introduced in 1995. These contracts
are limited to a ﬁxed term ranging from three months to two years.
It is a standard view that the reform stimulated the creation of a large
number of these temporary contracts, which currently dominate the ﬂow
of new jobs. However, there is now a growing concern about the volatility
of these temporary jobs, referred to as junk contracts, and a predominant
view that they tend to generate excessive turnover. This chapter studies the
eﬀect of this reform on job duration.2
Our main ﬁndings are that the reform generated an overall increase in
the hazard rate, and particularly so for the ﬁrst three months of employ-
ment. During this period, the average hazard rate increased by almost 40
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1. For an analysis of the eﬀects of job security provisions on employment and reallocation,
see Blanchard and Portugal (2001), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Nickell (1997), and
Pagés and Montenegro (1999).
2. Blanchard and Landier (2001) ﬁnd that temporary contracts in the French labor market
increased turnover but not employment. Similar results for Spain are reported in Saint-Paul
(2000).percent. For tenure above three months, the increase was on the order of
10 percent.
9.1 Recent Changes in Labor Market Legislation
During the 1990–1999 decade, there were two major changes in labor
market legislation. These have not been major reforms, but rather they in-
troduced ﬂexibility at the margin by creating ﬁxed-term and temporary
contracts that eliminate or reduce dismissal costs and labor taxes.
The original law (1976) speciﬁed mandated severance payments equiva-
lent to one month of salary per year of seniority. Changes were introduced
in December 1991 and March 1995.
9.1.1 The 1991 Reform
This reform introduced ﬁxed-term contracts and special-training con-
tracts for young workers. Fixed-term contracts to promote employment
were subject to the following terms:
• Applicability is restricted to workers who are registered in the national
employment oﬃce as unemployed or laid oﬀ as a consequence of gov-
ernment employment cutbacks.
• The minimum duration is six months. The minimum renewal period is
six months. The maximum total duration is eighteen months.
• Severance payment is determined in two ways. If the contract expires,
the payment consists of half one month’s salary. If the contract is ter-
minated before expiration, the previous law applies.
• A reduction in labor taxes means that employer contributions are re-
duced from 33 percent to less than 20 percent.
Fixed-term contracts for new activity involved a somewhat diﬀerent set
of conditions.
• Applicability is restricted to new establishments or new lines of pro-
duction or services in existing establishments.
• The minimum duration is six months. The minimum renewal period is
six months. The maximum total duration is twenty-four months.
• Severance payment is determined in the same ways as for ﬁxed-term
contracts to promote employment.
• The same reduction in labor taxes applies as for ﬁxed-term contracts
to promote employment.
The most distinct category consisted of training-promotion contracts,
which featured the following conditions:
• Applicability is limited to workers less than twenty-four years old.
• Duration varies from a minimum of four months to a maximum of
twenty-four months.
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• There are no labor taxes.
It appears that this reform did not have a great impact. The law required
approval by trade unions in order for these contracts to apply. The monthly
ﬂow of new employment promotion contracts registered at the employ-
ment oﬃce (which was a requirement) totaled less than 5,000 for the whole
country.
9.1.2 The 1995 Reform
This reform introduced a trial period for all contracts, special contracts
to promote the employment of certain age groups, and a special regime for
small ﬁrms. The trial period provision introduced the following condi-
tions:
• Applicability to all new contracts
• Duration of three months
• No severance payments for terminations within this period
• Tax reduction for employee from 20 percent to less than 8 percent, and
tax reduction for employer from 33 percent to approximately 10 per-
cent
Special employment promotion contracts:
• They are applicable to workers more than forty years old, who are not
required to register in government employment oﬃces.
• The minimum duration is six months; the minimum renewal period is
six months; the maximum duration is twenty-four months.
• There is no severance payment at termination of contract. Standard
severance payment applies for early termination.
• For labor taxes, employer contributions are reduced from 33 percent
to less than 20 percent.
Training contract conditions are similar to previous law for unemployed
workers between fourteen and twenty-ﬁve years of age.
In the case of small ﬁrms, the law establishes that these ﬁrms can use the
employment promotion contracts from the previous law (described previ-
ously) with the following added advantages:
• No previous approval of the trade unions is required.
• There is no need to register the contract in the government employ-
ment agency.
• There is no severance payment.
9.2 General Trends during the Period
The period considered has been marked by a sizable increase in unem-
ployment rates, starting at 7.5 percent in the beginning of the decade,
Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration: Argentina 499peaking in May 1995 at 20 percent, and staying around 17 percent in the
most recent surveys. Although part of this increase is explained by an up-
ward trend in participation, most is accounted for by unemployment of ex-
isting labor market participants. Figure 9.1 gives an account of this evolu-
tion since 1993. As far as the business cycle is concerned, ﬂuctuations have
been large in the period, averaging out to a 3.7 percent growth rate. As seen
in ﬁgure 9.2, the ﬁrst two years of our study correspond to a big recession
that is followed by three years of high growth rates. A new sharp recession
occurs in 1995, also followed by a period of high growth.
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 provide standard estimates of creation and destruc-
tion ﬂows for job matches. The rate of match creation is measured by the
ratio of employed workers with less than one month (or six months) of ten-
ure to the stock of employed workers. The rate of destruction is measured
by taking the ratio of unemployed workers with less than one month (or
six months) duration to the stock of employed workers.
These ﬂows are fairly constant up to 1994. The severe recession in 1995
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Fig. 9.1 Unemployment rate: Greater Buenos Aires region
Source: Ministerio de Economía, INDEC—May surveys.
Fig. 9.2 GNP growth: Constant prices 1986
Source: Ministerio de Economía, INDEC.results in a large shock to match destruction, which is then followed by a
steady increase in creation. After 1995, both ﬂows stay at values at least 50
percent larger than those experienced during the ﬁrst part of this decade.
The breakpoint (1995) is a recession year, but also the beginning of the new
labor market regime. In what follows, we attempt to identify the impact of
this regime change.
9.3 The Sample
We use a linked panel of household survey data for the area of the Fed-
eral District and surroundings (Gran Buenos Aires), which amounts to ap-
proximately 60 percent of total Argentinean employment. The survey is
conducted every six months (April/May and October) with a 25 percent ro-
tation of the panel. As a consequence, each household can—in principle—
be followed for two years at intervals of six months. Our sample consists of
the linked panels from May 1989 to October 1998. There are a total of ap-
proximately 64,000 individuals in the sample, evenly distributed through-
out the years, of whom over 44,000 have multiple observations. Based on
these observations, our sample comprises a total of over 93,000 transition
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Fig. 9.3 Match creation and destruction: Six monthspairs. After restricting the sample to those individuals between twenty-one
and sixty-ﬁve years old, we are left with a total of approximately 71,000
transition pairs. Our conditional likelihood estimates consider only those
individuals with initial tenure under ﬁve years who are still in the labor
force the following period. This leaves a total of 14,854 transitions.
9.3.1 Variables Used
The variables considered were the following:3
• Personal characteristics such as sex, age, and education
• Job characteristics, including
• type of employment (salaried worker or self-employed)
• size of ﬁrm
• beneﬁts received (social security contributions, paid vacations, ex-
tra month supplement, severance payment, and unemployment in-
surance)
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Fig. 9.4 Match creation and destruction: One month
3. For a list of variables included in this survey, see INDEC (2001).• duration of current job (if employed) or duration of unemployment
spell (if unemployed)
We restrict our analysis to salaried employment, thus excluding the self-
employed, entrepreneurs, or family workers, who are not subject to the
above regulations.
9.4 Measuring the Eﬀect of Regulation on Employment Duration
The 1995 reform provides a natural experiment that can be used to eval-
uate the impact of changes in regulation. Overall, one might expect an in-
crease in the ﬂows into and out of employment, as a consequence of the
availability of short-term contracts, which we quantify in the following.
Given the three-month limit to temporary contracts, one might also expect
to see a peak in the hazard rates at this term. The special regime for small
ﬁrms provides another source for a natural experiment. In particular, one
might expect a peak in the hazard rates for employment termination to ap-
pear at the point of expiration of the employment promotion contracts
(twenty-four months), as well as at times of renewal (every six months).
9.5 Methodological Considerations
9.5.1 Stock Sampling versus Flow Sampling
Our panel data allow us to compute conditional probabilities for transi-
tions out of employment, thus avoiding the problem of stock sampling.
Correspondingly, our speciﬁcation of hazard rates allows for duration de-
pendence.
9.5.2 Interval Censoring
The panel’s sampling plan presents the problem of interval censoring.
Consider two consecutive surveys, which take place at time t and t    ,
where   corresponds to the six months interval. The survey provides in-
formation on the agent’s state of employment for each of these two periods
and the elapsed duration in that state. Let sit and sit   denote the states and
ditand dit  the corresponding elapsed durations. Take a worker who is em-
ployed in the ﬁrst survey with elapsed duration d0. Three things may hap-
pen in the following interval: (1) the worker is employed in the same job
with duration d1   d0    ; (2) the worker is in a new job with duration d1
  ; and (3) the worker is unemployed where d1  is the length of the cur-
rent spell.
In cases (2) and (3), where a transition has occurred, it is impossible to
determine exactly when the initial job was terminated, because there could
have been multiple transitions. However, an upper bound for the duration
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sition had taken place. The sample variation in d1 for these workers is thus
informative and contributes to identifying the underlying hazard rates. As
usual, the observations from workers in case (1) can be treated as right-
censored observations.4
9.5.3 Measurement Error in Duration Data
As is well known, retrospective questions typically lead to signiﬁcant re-
porting errors. In recalling the length of a current or past spell, individuals
typically round oﬀ their elapsed duration. This gives rise to a common
heaping problem where reports get concentrated at particular duration
lengths, such as six months, one year, ﬁve years, ten years, and so on. This
is illustrated in ﬁgures 9.5 and 9.6, which give, respectively, reported
elapsed job tenure for employed workers and completed tenure in the last
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4. For an excellent discussion on interval censoring, see Magnac and Robin (1994).
Fig. 9.5 Reported job tenure (in months)
Fig. 9.6 Reported retrospective tenure (in months)job for those unemployed, corresponding to all salaried workers in our
sample. Unfortunately, some of these heaping times correspond to termi-
nation dates of certain contracts, making inference problematic. However,
assuming that the distribution for reporting errors has not changed over
time, the eﬀect of changes in the duration of speciﬁc contracts can still be
analyzed by looking at diﬀerences in hazard rates before and after the re-
form.
A second source of problems comes from the ambiguity in the question
used to calculate job tenure for employed workers. The survey asks “How
long have you been in this occupation?” Some respondents may interpret
the occupation as a job description and not a particular match. Measure-
ment error of this type is quite dramatic in our data. If we deﬁne a worker
who has not changed jobs as one for which job tenure in the second inter-
view exceeds six months, and if reports are correct in both intervals, job
tenure should have increased by six months between the two surveys. Table
9.1 gives a distribution of the change in tenure for all workers, those with
tenure less than one year, and those with tenure less than six months. As
seen, only 5.6 percent of all matches (13.6 percent of those less than one
year and 16 percent of those less than one month) satisfy this criteria. No-
tice that almost 24 percent of all reported changes in job tenure are nega-
tive (recall that we are excluding new jobs) and a similar amount report
changes in tenure of over one year. The degree of inconsistency is less for
workers with lower duration. Furthermore, for workers in this class, a large
fraction hold new jobs (less than six months of tenure).
Measurement error is probably less of a problem for identifying when an
individual has changed from one state to another (employment to unem-
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Table 9.1 Changes in Reported Tenure
All Workers Tenure   1 Year Tenure   6 Months
Change in Tenure % Cumulative % % Cumulative % % Cumulative %
Less than 0 23.7 23.7 1.7 1.7 0 0
0 22.7 46.4 8.0 9.7 0 0
1 0.2 46.6 0.8 10.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 47.1 1.9 12.5 1.1 1.6
3 0.6 47.7 2.3 14.8 1.5 3.1
4 1.2 48.8 4.8 19.6 4.6 7.7
5 1.3 50.1 6.1 25.7 7.1 14.8
6 5.6 55.7 13.6 39.4 16.0 30.9
7 1.1 56.8 5.1 44.5 8.8 39.7
8 0.9 57.6 3.8 48.3 6.3 46.0
9 0.8 58.4 3.6 51.9 6.5 52.4
10 0.7 59.1 2.8 54.7 4.5 56.9
11 0.5 59.6 2.4 57.1 4.2 61.1
12 16.3 75.9 10.7 67.9 1.7 62.8ployment or vice versa), for which there is a speciﬁc question in the survey.
The measurement error is more critical in attempting to identify transi-
tions within the same state, times of transition, and elapsed duration. Un-
less there has been a change of state, we adopt the convention of deﬁning
as a new spell one where tenure or unemployment duration in the second
survey is less than or equal to six months. If the survey indicates a change
of state and elapsed duration in the second state exceeds six months, we
consider this a change of state with censored time of change.
9.6 Flows in and out of Employment
The panel data can be used to estimate total ﬂows in and out of employ-
ment. The ﬂows are calculated by considering all employed workers in a
given survey and observing their state in the following survey period. The
ﬂow data thus constructed is pooled across all samples to compute the
mean transition probabilities. All calculations were done for salaried
workers. Figure 9.7 gives estimates corresponding to all transitions of em-
ployed workers into unemployment or a new job. Total ﬂows out of em-
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Fig. 9.7 Transitions from employmentployment increased from approximately 10 percent at the beginning of our
sample period to over 15 percent at the end. Both components of the out-
ﬂow have increased, though in the last few years the growth comes mostly
from changes to new jobs.5 Similar conclusions follow when considering
transition ﬂows for workers with short initial job tenure.
Figure 9.8 considers the ﬂows out of unemployment. These have de-
creased during the sample period, particularly dominated by lower proba-
bilities of being employed after the six month interval between surveys.
Table 9.2 gives hazard rates for total separation, classiﬁed by initial job
tenure and for years prior to and after the 1995 reform. Most remarkably,
these hazard rates exhibit a sharp increase for workers in low tenure brack-
ets. In contrast, for workers with initial tenure over six months, there is no
detectable change. This table also indicates that total separation rates are
initially very high and decrease rapidly with tenure.
Table 9.3 gives the fraction of employed workers in each tenure bracket
that ended unemployed in the following survey. The patterns are quite sim-
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5. It is worth recalling that, due to interval censoring, a transition to a new job may have
involved a passage through unemployment.
Fig. 9.8 Transitions from unemploymentilar, with large increases after the reform for workers with initial tenure un-
der three months. It is worth recalling that this duration corresponds to the
time limit of temporary contracts. Overall, the transitions to unemploy-
ment are a small, but increasing, fraction of total separations. This could
be the consequence of either high quits into new jobs or high rates of es-
cape from unemployment. Estimates of the multiple-cycles model studied
in the following indicate that the latter eﬀect dominates.
Tables 9.4 through 9.9provide decompositions of the previous two tables
by age, beneﬁts, and ﬁrm size. The following speciﬁc conclusions emerge:
508 Hugo A. Hopenhayn
Table 9.3 Hazard Rates of Involuntary Separations (%)
Years Before After
0–1 month 12.9 22.7
1–3 months 9.9 12.8
3–6 months 6.4 8.1
6 months–1 year 5.8 6.8
1–2 years 3.2 4.1
2–5 years 2.5 3.4
Total 3.5 5.0
Table 9.2 Hazard Rates for Total Separations (%)
Years Before After
0–1 month 52.8 66.1
1–3 months 37.3 45.6
3–6 months 25.3 32.6
6 months–1 years 21.2 22.3
1–2 years 13.5 13.5
2–5 years 9.1 9.9
Total 13.1 15.7
Table 9.4 Hazard Rates for Total Separations, by Age (%)
Younger than 25 25–40 Older than 40
Years Before After Before After Before After
0–1 month 64.0 78.2 48.0 60.0 40.3 60.5
1–3 months 46.1 50.8 35.4 42.9 23.2 41.6
3–6 months 31.9 31.9 22.0 38.9 22.4 23.6
6 months–1 year 27.4 26.6 19.5 20.0 15.9 19.8
1–2 years 16.9 14.8 11.5 13.6 13.1 11.8
2–5 years 11.3 15.6 8.5 8.9 8.4 7.5
Total 25.1 28.3 12.6 15.4 8.5 10.51. The increase in the hazard rate is larger for employees with no bene-
ﬁts. This may actually be explained by the fact that workers on employment
promotion contracts—such as the trial period—do not get beneﬁts. In-
deed, as we will see later, the share of the ﬂow out of employment due to
termination of temporary contracts increased signiﬁcantly after the re-
form.
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Table 9.5 Hazard Rates of Involuntary Separations, by Age (%)
Younger than 25 25–40 Older than 40
Years Before After Before After Before After
0–1 month 14.4 30.7 11.2 16.9 12.9 20.9
1–3 months 15.0 14.2 5.7 12.9 7.1 10.8
3–6 months 6.9 6.6 5.6 10.6 6.7 6.4
6 months–1 year 8.2 6.0 4.3 5.6 4.8 9.6
1–2 years 2.3 5.0 2.2 4.0 5.4 3.3
2–5 years 2.8 4.7 2.4 3.2 2.3 2.9
Total 4.7 5.4 3.0 4.6 2.6 3.7
Table 9.7 Hazard Rates of Total Separations, by Firm Size (%)
Small Firms Large Firms
Years Before After Before After
0–1 month 51.0 66.3 58.7 65.3
1–3 months 39.0 47.8 31.5 38.3
3–6 months 24.4 34.0 28.0 28.5
6 months–1 year 21.7 22.8 19.4 20.7
1–2 years 14.5 14.8 10.8 10.1
2–5 years 9.4 11.2 8.3 6.7
Total 13.9 17.7 11.2 11.0
Table 9.6 Hazard Rates of Total Separations, by Social Beneﬁts (%)
No Beneﬁts All Beneﬁts
Years Before After Before After
0–1 month 53.3 68.7 46.9 48.3
1–3 months 44.4 48.9 25.4 38.2
3–6 months 27.1 39.5 23.5 20.9
6 months–1 year 24.3 27.3 16.1 16.5
1–2 years 16.7 19.9 10.0 7.3
2–5 years 11.2 12.3 8.3 7.8
Total 17.0 22.9 9.2 8.62. The hazard rates separations in low-duration brackets increase more
for the treatment groups (small ﬁrms, workers less than twenty-ﬁve and
over forty). The diﬀerence is somewhat less pronounced when considering
ﬂows into unemployment. This suggests that workers in these targeted
groups may be experiencing a fast turnaround from unemployment.
9.7 Hazard Rate Estimation
This section gives details on the methodology used to estimate hazard
rates.6
9.7.1 Estimation
We construct a piecewise constant-baseline hazard function. Consider a
grid of durations {0   t0   t1   ...     tJ}, and for j   1, . . . , J let  j   tj –
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Table 9.9 Hazard Rates of Involuntary Separations, by Firm Size (%)
Small Firms Large Firms
Years Before After Before After
0–1 month 13.0 23.2 12.7 20.4
1–3 months 10.4 12.8 8.1 13.0
3–6 months 6.3 8.8 6.5 6.0
6 months–1 year 5.4 6.5 6.9 8.0
1–2 years 3.4 4.7 2.5 2.8
2–5 years 2.5 4.2 2.4 1.7
Total 3.5 5.6 3.4 3.4
Table 9.8 Hazard Rates of Involuntary Separations, by Social Beneﬁts (%)
No Beneﬁts All Beneﬁts
Years Before After Before After
0–1 month 12.7 24.4 10.2 12.1
1–3 months 10.9 13.9 8.5 11.6
3–6 months 7.1 8.7 5.9 7.1
6 months–1 year 6.6 8.3 4.3 5.5
1–2 years 4.1 5.8 1.8 2.3
2–5 years 2.5 3.8 2.8 3.0
Total 2.1 2.8 2.6 3.0
6. Hazard function models have been extensively used in the economic literature over the
last two decades (compare, e.g., Lancaster [1990] and Heckman and Singer [1984]).tj–1, denote the length of each of the corresponding Jintervals. Hazard rates
are assumed constant within each interval. Let J(t)   max{ jtj   t}, so
that tJ(t)   t   tJ(t) 1.
Given vectors of covariates x   (x1,  x2) and parameters     ( 0,
{ j}j 1,...,J), the hazard rate is given by
h(t; x,  )   g(x1,  0)hJ(t)(x2,  J(t)).
This is a hybrid model, where some covariates (x1) aﬀect the hazard rate
proportionately, while the remaining covariates (x2) aﬀect each segment
separately. As an example, taking one of the dummy variables to be the in-
dicator of the years with temporary contracts, this formulation allows us
to study the eﬀect these contracts had on diﬀerent segments of the hazard
rate.
Given the above speciﬁcation, the survival function S(t) satisﬁes
S(t; x,  )  exp  g(x1,  1)  ∑
1 j J(t) 1
hj(x2,  2j1) j hJ(t)(x2,  2j1)(t tJ(t))  .
Our data consists of employment spells that may have been completed or
continued between two consecutive interviews. For both types of spells, we
have information on elapsed duration at the time of the ﬁrst interview,
which we denote by t0 months. In case of incomplete spells, elapsed dura-
tion in the second interval, t1, is given by t1 t0 6 because the survey takes
place every six months. In case of complete spells, the information is limited
due to interval censoring. Letting  denote the duration of the new spell (ei-
ther a new job or unemployment), all we know is that t1   [t0, t0   6 –  ].
The conditional probability of a continuing spell is given by S(t0   6)/
S(t0), and the conditional probability of a completed spell is given by (S[t0]
– S[t0   6 –  ])/S(t0). Letting I0 denote the set of individuals with continu-
ing spells and I1 those with completed spells, the likelihood function is
given by
ln L(x,  )  ∑
i I0
[ln S(ti   6; xi,  )   ln S(ti; xi,  )] 
 ∑
i I1
{ln[S(ti; xi,  )   S(ti   6    ; xi,  )]ln S(ti; xi,  )}.
Note that by restricting our estimates to conditional probabilities, we cir-
cumvent the problems associated to length bias sampling and nonstation-
arity of ﬂows. This is also the reason why we have not included in our esti-
mates the information of the elapsed length of the second spell for those
individuals that completed the initial spell and were employed in a new job
at the time of the second interview.
The speciﬁcation used for the hazard functions is log-linear, so g(x,  )  
exp(  x) and hj(x,  j)   exp( j x).
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The following variables were included in the estimates:
Age Measured in Years
Sex 0   female; 1   male
Sch1 Complete elementary school
Sch2 Incomplete high school
Sch3 Complete high school
Sch4 Incomplete college
Sch5 Completed college
Large ﬁrm Dummy for more than 50 employees
Beneﬁts 0   no beneﬁts; 1   some or all beneﬁts
95–98 Dummy for years 95–98
Table 9.10 gives the mean hazard rates and survival function implied by
our estimates. Note that hazard rates are quite large during the ﬁrst few
months and fall rapidly thereafter. Almost half of the jobs are terminated
before three months, and approximately one-third reach one year. At that
point, hazard rates are very low.
Table 9.11 gives the maximum likelihood estimates. For each set of re-
gressions, there are three columns giving, respectively, the parameter esti-
mates, the standard errors, and the risk ratios. Naturally, the latter are only
given for dummy variables. The demographic covariates are highly signiﬁ-
cant and have similar values across the three speciﬁcations. Age decreases
the hazard rate at a rate of 1.3 percent per year. Male workers face a 20 per-
cent higher risk of termination. Higher schooling reduces the risk of job
termination. In particular, college graduates have half the risk of those
workers with no complete elementary education. Employment in a large
ﬁrm results in a mild (but signiﬁcant) reduction in this risk. Finally, work-
ers with informal labor contracts (those perceiving no beneﬁts) have twice
as high a risk of employment termination.
The ﬁrst three columns correspond to estimates of a hazard function
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Table 9.10 Survival Function and Hazard Rate
Years Survival Function Hazard Ratea
1 monthb 1 0.326
3 months 0.542 0.158
6 months 0.361 0.023
1 year 0.323 0.023
2 years 0.258 0.016
5 years 0.162
aHazard rates are monthly and constant in the interval deﬁned by the given row and the fol-
lowing one.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with two segments: elapsed duration of less than three months and elapsed
duration of more than three months. Though it is plausible that policy
changes aﬀect all of the hazard function, the introduction of temporary
contracts in 1995 is more likely to impact the ﬁrst segment. Indeed, our es-
timates show this pattern: Hazard rates for the ﬁrst three months rise by al-
most 40 percent after 1995, while the overall increase for jobs with longer
tenure is around 10 percent. These parameters are estimated quite pre-
cisely, so this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.
The second speciﬁcation provides a larger set of duration intervals. Af-
ter 1995, hazard rates in the one- to three-month interval increase by more
than 40 percent. For longer tenure brackets, the increase is not monotonic.
Most remarkably, in the six- to twelve-month segment, the increase is also
close to 40 percent. However, this increase applies to a much lower base:
For the average individual in the sample, after 1995 hazard rates in the one-
to three-month interval increase by 23 percentage points (33 percent to 46
percent), while for the six- to twelve-month interval, the increase repre-
sents less than 1 percentage point (2.3 percent to 3.2 percent).
The increase in hazard rates for jobs exceeding the three-month limit
may seem perplexing. However, there is an explanation. Temporary con-
tracts have two eﬀects. On the one hand, it allows ﬁrms to terminate bad
matches more rapidly. This selection eﬀect leads to a decrease in hazard
rates for the period following the end of a temporary contract. On the other
hand, temporary contracts reduce the cost of turnover and thus the cost of
experimenting with new matches. This can have a positive impact on over-
all hazard rates.
The third speciﬁcation allows for the dummies of ﬁrm size and its inter-
action with 1995–1998 to aﬀect selectively each segment of the hazard rate.
This speciﬁcation allows us to test the impact of the special regime for
small ﬁrms introduced in 1995. None of the coeﬃcients for these added
variables turns out to be signiﬁcant. Similar results were obtained when in-
cluding dummy variables for age groups interacted with 1995–1998 in each
of the segments. Thus, the evidence does not detect a signiﬁcant impact of
the special regimes for small ﬁrms and young workers.
9.9 Final Remarks
This chapter analyzes the impact of the 1995 labor market in Argentina.
Our results show that this reform had a very strong impact on labor turn-
over, increasing hazard rates during the trial period by 40 percent, with-
out a compensating decrease for longer tenure. In contrast, the special re-
gimes for small ﬁrms and young workers show no sizable eﬀects.
What is the economic signiﬁcance of this response? The policies implied
lower taxes for workers with temporary contracts, inducing an increase in
hiring but also a substitution away from longer-term employment. Evalu-
Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration: Argentina 515ating the costs of this type of distortion is obviously an important question.
In addition, by reducing the cost of experiencing new matches, this policy
may have contributed to a better allocation of workers to ﬁrms. As indi-
cated by the increase in hazard rates for tenures beyond the limit of tem-
porary contracts, ﬁrms seem to have reacted positively to this incentive.
A complete evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of these policies would
require formulating and estimating a structural model of job matching.
The results presented in this chapter suggest that research eﬀorts in this di-
rection can prove substantial.
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